World Congress on Risk 2015
19-23 July, 2015, Singapore

Online Program



Session Schedule & Abstracts


* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.

Common abbreviations

Wednesday 22-07-2015

W3-A
Detecting and responding to new and emerging risks

Room: Aspiration   13:30–15:00

Chair(s): Christine Reed



1    United by Common Purpose: Bridging Australia and New Zealand\'s Biosecurity Research Investments. Robinson Andrew, CEBRA, The University of Melbourne   a.robinson@ms.unimelb.edu.au (157)

Abstract: Shared biosecurity challenges face the Australian and New Zealand governments and industry. Both countries import simliar types of goods from similar regions, both are islands, both depend heavily on agricultural exports, and each highly values its ecological uniqueness. The Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis, CEBRA, is a biosecurity-focused research provider that is jointly funded by the Australian Federal Department of Agriculture (Ag) and the New Zealand Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI). CEBRA started in 2013, following from ACERA (the Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis), with a brief to provide expertise in biosecurity-centred risk analysis to both governments. This presentation describes the structure and functions of CEBRA, and the nature of its relationships with its funding bodies and other partners. We identify those of CEBRA\'s policies that arguably have led to its considerable momentum in the short term, and contrast them with those of ACERA, its predecessor. Briefly, we argue that the strategy by which CEBRA develops its work plan, which originates and is motivated on the government side, provides a straightforward link between research outcomes and successful implementation. We will also include brief snapshots of CEBRA\'s successes and even briefer snapshots of its failures, and outline the lessons that we have learned in navigating the whitewaters of bilateral biosecurity policy.

2    Integrating Geospatial Information in Economic Sector Prioritization under Extreme-event Conditions. Resurreccion JZ, University of the Philippines; Paringit EC, University of the Philippines; Santos JR, The George Washington University   joanna71304@yahoo.com (299)

Abstract: In the most disaster-prone countries such as the Philippines, weather events including typhoons not only occur often but also come extraordinarily fierce. The vulnerability to flooding from such extreme events is expected to get worse due to climate change. The repercussions to a developing economy are thus high in terms of significant disruptions experienced by the manufacturing, agricultural, infrastructure and service sectors. Further, sectors are heterogeneously distributed within the economic region contributing to variability in their vulnerability based on geographical positions relative to identified high, medium and low flood risk areas. Consequently, in developing a sector prioritization plan, this variability must be considered in order to strategically allocate limited available key resources and deter the highest risks of disruption. This research builds on initial modeling made involving a heterogeneous distribution of economic sectors that integrated the novelty of using flood hazard map information to a Dynamic Inoperability Input-output Model (DIIM). The flood hazard maps have been recently developed with the Light Detection and Ranging technology (LiDAR) as commissioned by the Philippine government. From a LiDAR-based input of perturbations, DIIM accounted for simulating economic risk estimates, namely, economic losses and disruption levels. This research provides an extension of the initial modeling into a multi-criteria economic risk prioritization tool that utilizes the LiDAR-based risk estimates as input to sector prioritization. The tool plots the criticality of each sector given disruption level and economic losses and prioritizes the sectors based on a decision-maker preference beta distribution. The extension investigates the sensitivity of identified critical sectors given homogenous and heterogeneous sector distributions. The resulting methodology will have flexibility and scalability over other hazard maps for other regions and disasters.

3    The International Biosecurity Intelligence System. Burgman M    (119)

Abstract: The International Biosecurity Intelligence System (IBIS) is a unique blend of internet surveillance and crowd-sourced expertise. The system scans open sources and specific relevant sites such as blogs and scientific journals, looking for information that is relevant to biosecurity. Users can structure the search terms to suit specific needs , which can be as narrow or broad as they need. The system also publishes daily digests to interested users who can discuss and enhance open source information with new data or perspectives. The system is implemented to serve aquatic, plant and animal biosecurity issues. There are several options for future development, and this presentation will outline the strengths and limitations of the systems and some examples of effective use.

4    Turning intelligence into effective management of risks: New Zealand’s Emerging Risks System for Biosecurity. Reed C    (325)

Abstract: Identifying potential and emerging threats is an important component of effective biosecurity risk management. An independent review of import requirements and border processes around the introduction of Pseudomonas syringae pv. actinidiae (Psa) into New Zealand recommended that we “renew efforts to centralise the identification and management of emerging risks”. A new system was implemented in August 2012 to systematically scan for and respond to new and emerging biosecurity risks affecting plants and animals (or that may carry human disease) in the terrestrial and aquatic environments. The system focuses on taking new information on changes in hosts, distribution and impacts of organisms; conducting rapid risk assessment to determine whether there is an increase in the risk profile for New Zealand; communicating any change in risk profiles to risk managers who assess what action (if any) may be needed (off-shore, at the border, or in readiness and response planning) and monitoring the flow and uptake of information. In just over two years we have received, assessed, communicated and allocated for action some 1400 alerts coming into the system. A number of import conditions have been strengthened to reduce risk to New Zealand as a result of this systematic approach in responding to new information on emerging risks.



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