World Congress on Risk 2015
19-23 July, 2015, Singapore
Session Schedule & Abstracts
* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.
|Chair(s): Kathleen Aviso|
1 DECISION SUPPORT FOR DYNAMIC SYSTEMSâRISK ASSESSMENT IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS. Brauner F, Cologne University of Applied Sciences (CUAS); Pickl S, Bundeswehr University Munich; Mudimu OA, Cologne University of Applied Sciences (CUAS); Lechleuthner A, Cologne University of Applied Sciences (CUAS) firstname.lastname@example.org (187)|
Abstract: Critical infrastructure such as public transportation systems (PTS) play an important role in todayâs society and economy. Any disturbance leads to manifold consequences in other systems. Man-made disasters such as terrorist attacks pose special challenges. Characteristically, PTS are elaborate networks with mostly open access at many different entrance points, making them vulnerable and easy targets. But how can these systems protected? The joint research project RiKoV, considers new methodologies of risk analysis to identify and assess such anthropogenic events in order to find well-balanced and cost-effective security measures to lower the risks to an acceptable level. The integration of end-users from the very beginning is essential to sustain such measures. Project RiKoV is divided into five phases: scenario-based risk assessment, identification of suitable security systems, prioritization of the security measures, budgeting, and installation. In the first step, possible scenarios are be drawn up by analyzing historical events and case studies. The scenarios are then subjected to a vulnerability analysis using process models to estimate their vulnerability categories. Together with a consequence and threat analysis (including motivation + ability of the attacker) the data is fed into a three-dimensional risk matrix. The RiKoV matrix replaces the conventional risk matrix of probability and consequence. In the second step, the effects of the various security measures are examined in the context of risk changes in the matrix until the elimination of the unacceptable risks. The correlation between measures and risks is presented in a multi-criteria decision tool that includes additional values such as social acceptance, legal restrictions, and cost-effectiveness. The RiKoV system is a new contribution to risk management in dynamic systems that have to deal with unpredictable events. In times of limited budgets and increasingly complex systems, this approach helps improve decision-making to strike the best balance between security and affordability.
2 Managing networked risks: a complexity perspective on risk management in networked systems. Van der Steen M., Netherlands School of Public Administration; Stepanyan M., Risk Society email@example.com (165)|
Abstract: Our dependence on critical networks is difficult to overestimate. However, networks also produce massive dangers. Networks are difficult to oversee and predict, because they are interactive, emergent, and continuously evolving. Hazards do not follow a linear development through networks, but can accelerate fast â in size and pace -, cascade or fade away unexpectedly. Development in networks should be understood as interactive complexity. Complexity is not about âmany relationsâ and âa lot of informationâ, but refers to the dynamic and interaction between different elements of organizations and processes; complex is not the same as complicated. Not the individual parts of the system count, but the interactions between them. Effects happen in chains that are dynamic and emergent. This complexity-perspective asks for different tools and methods for understanding, assessment and management of risks. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action of 2010 called upon member states to develop national approaches towards risk management. The Commission Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment that followed provides general guidelines for national risk assessment. This has given rise to a variety of national risk assessment methodologies developed by the member states. However, this approach has little attention for the principles of interactive-complexity and the networked nature of risks. Therefore, this paper takes a complexity perspective to reflect on how countriesâ risk assessment deal with cross-border dynamics - risks across the borders of the time, space, and domain of formalized networks. Interactive complexity suggests that many of the most important risks are inherently cross-sectorial, cross-generational, and inherently âcrossâ nature. How to understand, assess and manage such risks, and how may that perspective help to ensure sustainable innovation and development?
3 Optimization of a FAHP-based Inoperability Input-Output Model for Infrastructure Systems. Aviso K.B., De La Salle University; Promentilla M.A.B., De La Salle University; Yu K.D.S., De La Salle University; Santos J.R., The George Washington University; Tan R. R., De La Salle University firstname.lastname@example.org (199)|
Abstract: Infrastructure systems which provide essential services such as electricity, transportation and communication, play a major role in the recovery of an economy after a disruptive event. Maintaining the integrity of infrastructure systems facilitate effective recovery. The interdependencies among economic sectors however, may cause damages to initially unaffected infrastructure systems, even when the impact of a disaster is directed elsewhere. The degree of interdependence between infrastructure systems and other economic sectors provides an indication of an economyâs resilience to catastrophic events. A conventional approach to estimate this involves calibrating the interdependencies using economic input-output tables. Alternatively, these can be elicited from domain experts through analytic hierarchy process. Modelling interdependencies provides insights for optimal implementation of recovery strategies. This work develops a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) approach to calibrate an inoperability input-output model (IIM) for infrastructure systems using expert judgment. The resulting IIM model can then be used within a fuzzy optimization framework to determine equitable distributions of inoperability across sectors under crisis conditions.
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