Society For Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2017

Session Schedule & Abstracts


* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.

Common abbreviations

T2-E
Defense and Policy

Room: Salon E   10:30 am–12:10 pm

Chair(s): Debra Decker   ddecker@stimson.org

Sponsored by Security and Defense Specialty Group



T2-E.1  10:30 am  A System of Systems Approach to Layered Security at a Foward Operating Base. Hoffman M*, Turnley J, Wachtel A, Speed A, Gauthier J, Muñoz-Ramos K, Kittinger R; Sandia National Laboratories and Galisteo Consulting Group Inc.   mjhoffm@sandia.gov

Abstract: Discrete event System of Systems (SoS) modeling approaches emerged from the engineering field and are still strongly oriented towards engineered rather than human systems. If humans are included, it is in peripheral roles as system managers or as participants with assumed performance parameters. A Sandia team has developed a prototype SoS model that fully incorporates both the engineered and human systems and their interactions, and allows for the analysis of performance features and a novel method of assessing failure risk at the SoS level that might not be evident with either an engineering- or a human-focused model. The model use case is perimeter security at a military forward operating base (FOB) focusing on entry check points (ECPs), a layered security application. The focus on ECPs required that the modeling team have a reasonable understanding of the full FOB security system, ranging from activities of guards in towers to the level and points of involvement of indigenous personnel in FOB security, the communication among all elements of the FOB involved in perimeter security, and the various required technologies for all tasks, including weapons. The team also needed domain knowledge of the included technologies and military activities and policies. A multidisciplinary modeling team was assembled to elicit the business rules and tasks of a FOB from interviews and secondary sources. The model itself is built in FlexSim, an off-the-shelf discrete event simulation software that can handle a wide array of model and logic structures and flows. Overall effectiveness of the SoS perimeter security system was assessed by the team through a novel approach based on the concept of d’ from signal detection theory, extended to psychophysics. This new approach shows that, although each functional element involving human-technology interaction may be highly effective, the effectiveness of the SoS as a whole can still be relatively poor.

T2-E.2  10:50 am  Emotion and Individual Reasoning About Exclusively Negative Risks: Public Responses to a Military Crisis between the U.S. and North Korea. Ripberger JT*, Gupta K, Jenkins-Smith H, Silva C; University of Oklahoma   kuhikagupta@ou.edu

Abstract: A considerable body of scholarship shows that individuals rely on the affect heuristic (positive/negative feelings) when formulating perceptions and making decisions that involve risk. This is especially true when risks involve a combination of positive attributes that evoke “good” feelings, and negative attributes that evoke “bad” feelings. In these situations, positive and negative “gut” reactions provide discriminant information about the risk. The affect heuristic is less discriminate when risks are exclusively negative (all feelings are bad). Here, a small but growing body of scholarship indicates that people draw on more specific types of negative emotion, such as fear, anger, and/or sadness when formulating perceptions and making decisions about risk. We contribute to this growth by addressing three questions: (1) Do people experience different negative emotions in response to the same situations? (2) If so, why? What factors orient the negative emotions that people experience? (3) What are the policy consequences of these differences? Do different emotions promote different opinions about how the government should address/respond to a given risk? We address these questions by analyzing responses to an experiment on a recent survey of U.S. adults (n = 3,000) that involves a military crisis between the United States and North Korea. Results indicate (1) significant variation in the negative emotions that respondents experience; (2) that factors such as gender, culture, and ideology systematically orient the negative emotions that people experience; and (3) that emotions strongly influence respondent opinions about how the U.S. government should act in response to the military crisis.

T2-E.3  11:10 am  Risk Governance for Security: International Challenges for the Nuclear Sector. Decker DK*; Stimson Center   ddecker@stimson.org

Abstract: The Nuclear Security Summits, initiated by former President Barack Obama, highlighted the need to better address risks in the nuclear sector. Parallel to the summits of the heads of state, nuclear operators held official side summits; these Nuclear Industry Summits considered various risks of specific concern to operators, such as cyber. Although the series of summits concluded in 2016, both governments and industry agreed on the need to continue work to improve nuclear security. This presentation will give a brief overview of the summits and the governance challenges facing international organizations tasked by governments for follow-on work and will report on industry’s own risk governance challenges and how they are being or should be addressed. Based on interviews with regulators, standards developers, insurers, operators and others, we found that regulatory or standards compliance, e.g., with ISO 90001 or ISO 14001, is not sufficient. Good leadership and oversight are needed to inspire a culture that leads to good performance and security, with this being especially of concern in different national systems. The Stimson Center’s nuclear security group is helping the international nuclear industry develop a good governance template that would potentially reduce risks and attendant liabilities (see: https://www.stimson.org/content /demonstrating-due-care-cyber-liability- considerations-nuclear-facilities) and gain benefits from insurers, regulators and the public, if good governance is appropriately demonstrated. This presentation will share some of the initial work toward this board-level risk governance framework, including a discussion of what selected nuclear operators as well as other industries are doing to demonstrate good risk management, with a focus on security and other tail risks.

T2-E.4  11:30 am  Inconvenient Truths: When Risks Aren't as Severe as You Would Like. Rouse JR*; Arete Associates and The Joint Staff   jrouse@arete.com

Abstract: Over the past 15 years, Pentagon leaders and analysts have worked diligently to more closely tie risk analysis to resource priorities after years of doing them independently. Unfortunately they have done their work too well, and in the battle for resources stakeholders either ignore or inflate standard risk metrics to support their claims. How Joint Staff leaders and staffers have addressed this challenge provides significant insights to analysts and leaders in government and other budget-driven organizations. Attendees will benefit from a discussion of techniques to most accurately bound the type and degree of risk associated with resource decisions; techniques transferable to the private sector as well. The endstate is a risk-informed decision-making process that clarifies rather than obscures choices.

T2-E.5  11:50 am  Exploring Optimal Risk-Based Strategies for Medical Countermeasure (MCM) Stockpiles. Hartnett E*, Payette P, Paoli G; Risk Sciences International   ehartnett@risksciences.com

Abstract: Medical Countermeasures (MCMs) are therapeutic products (i.e., drugs, vaccines and medical devices, as defined by the Food and Drugs Act) that may be used in response to events causing widespread public harm. These events may by terrorism related, unintentional events (e.g. accident at a nuclear power plant), or naturally occurring threats (e.g. hurricane). Should an event occur, time is of the essence to minimize the public health impact, and usual medical resource levels may not be sufficient, or even appropriate, to meet the needs of individuals requiring medical attention. To address this, governing bodies are developing stockpiles of MCMs to enable rapid and appropriate response by health authorities should an event occur. Several challenges are present when designing and maintaining a stockpile in preparation for such low-probability high-consequence events, some of which have never been directly observed, but may be considered a legitimate threat. The most obvious challenge is which MCMs to stockpile, and at what levels. Once these decisions have been made, the next challenge is to design a purchasing/procurement strategy that provides the optimum public health protection achievable. Such a strategy should take into consideration factors that affect the viability and sustainability of the stockpile. These factors include yearly budget limitations and fluctuations, product shelf-life, and availability. This presentation discusses general issues and challenges when exploring MCM stockpile development. We will describe a methodology to explore optimal risk-based procurement strategies using cost-effectiveness metrics based on quantitative estimates of public health burden. The methodology enables exploration of alternative strategies that minimize the residual public health risk year-over-year in the face of finite funds, limited shelf life, and other constraints.



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