Society For Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2017

Session Schedule & Abstracts

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Common abbreviations

Symposium: The Practice and Research of Resilience

Room: Salon C   3:30 pm–5:10 pm

Chair(s): Igor Linkov

Sponsored by Decision Analysis and Risk Specialty Group

Resilience as a concept has been adopted by many fields, including psychology, engineering, medicine, and other social and physical sciences. It has served as a tool to address risks in or related to cyber security supply chains, infrastructure, and climate change, among others. It has been described as a complement to risk assessment exercises, particularly within environments of high system complexity and the potential for cascading system failures. This symposia session will include discussion from emerging research in the field, and will include specific insight into the operationalization of resilience for application purposes.

M4-C.1  3:30 pm  Robustness and Resilience of Large-Scale Command and Control Networks. Ganin A*, Kitsak M, Eisenberg DA, Alderson DL, Linkov I; University of Virginia and U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center; Northeastern University; Arizona State University; Naval Postgraduate School; U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center

Abstract: Command and control (C2) systems used in military and rescue operations enable coordinated efforts of personnel to complete the mission in complex and time-sensitive environments. Successful coordination requires stable communication channels both among individuals comprising the social domain of the system and hardware components in the physical domain. We represent C2 systems as multilayered networks and study how their topological properties affect their connectivity. A classical percolation model characterizes the size of the largest connected component (LCC) of the network after an adverse event, modeled as a random removal of links or nodes. Well-known results highlight the importance of the distribution of links among nodes (degree distribution) for this form of robustness. We extend the above model to determine the persistence of nodes in the LCC in multiple stochastic realizations of the adverse event. First, we introduce the concept of the persistent largest connected component (PLCC) defined as the set of nodes which belong to the LCC over the course of many adverse events. We derive analytic equations to define the probability that a node of a certain degree belongs to the PLCC as well as the size of the PLCC itself. We support the analytical equations with high performance computing simulations and observe that the stability of the LCC is significantly different for link percolation (removal of links) and node percolation (removal of nodes). Whereas in the case of node percolation it is not possible to maintain a persistent LCC, in the case of link percolation the connectivity of the network may be ensured with high probability by adjusting the network's degree distribution. We also propose and discuss a recovery model to evaluate the resilience of the system. Our results have implications for optimal allocation of communication channels between the most important command and control agents under constrained resources.

M4-C.2  3:50 pm  Can You Be Smart and Resilient at the Same Time? Marchese DC*, Linkov I; U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center

Abstract: In response to the recent eruption of advanced technologies such as the internet of things, autonomous vehicles and intelligent personal assistants, there is a growing effort to integrate systems in a way that promotes sustainability and enhances quality of life. Smart systems, which collect, analyze and utilize data in real time are a result of this effort. Unsurprisingly, smart systems have advanced faster than the ability of developers to evaluate the response of these systems to disruptive events. This presentation serves to discuss the difference in disruption response that exists between independent traditional systems and connected smart systems. Systems of interest include water/wastewater/stormwater, energy, transportation, agriculture and telecommunication systems. Disruption response is evaluated as resilience, defined as the ability of a system to plan for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to disturbances. This discussion highlights how smart systems, which connect the multilayer physical, social and information networks, are more resilient to random disruptions (e.g. natural disasters) that often impact trivial parts of the network, but less resilient to targeted attacks (e.g. cyberattacks) on critical information systems. This disruption response is important to the long-term success of smart systems. Moreover, this investigation into the relationship between resilience and sustainability is critical for developing an efficient and reliable future.

M4-C.3  4:10 pm  Practical application of the SmartResilience methodology for assessing resilience of multiple critical infrastructures. Ă˜ien K*, Jovanović AS; EU-VRi, Germany

Abstract: The EU research project SmartResilience is developing a resilience assessment methodology, which takes the vulnerability of SCIs into account in a holistic manner. This methodology is based on the identification of existing and new, smart indicators of resilience. The resilience attributes considered are based on the definition of resilience used in the project, corresponding to the five phases of the resilience cycle. For each of these phases, the issues that are important for them are identified, and indicators to measure those issues are developed. Thus, the three lowest levels in the SmartResilience structure are phases, issues and indicators. In addition, the overall structure consists of the area level, e.g. a city or smart city, the critical infrastructures (CIs) within that area, and finally the threats considered most relevant for each of the CIs. Any type or form of indicators are considered appropriate in the methodology, meaning that they can be yes/no questions, numbers, percentages, portions, or some other type. Their real values, of whatever type, are collected and transformed to a score obtained by interpolation between the best and worst values. The identification, collection and storage of issues and indicators in a database are performed in several stages throughout the project and they are refined through an iterative process. The collection consists of over 600 relevant issues and corresponding indicators used to measure resilience of the respective infrastructure. In this paper, a practical application of the resilience assessment methodology is demonstrated on the cases of the smart critical infrastructures in the area of production (refineries), transportation (airport) and smart cities. It emphasizes the baseline resilience assessment performed periodically for multiple critical infrastructures. However, it also considers continuous monitoring, stress testing and issues related to interactions and cascading effects.

M4-C.4  4:30 pm  Integrating Resilience Across the Organization. Wood MD*, Blue S, Cato C, Wells E, Zemba V, Linkov I; U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center & U.S. Army Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences

Abstract: Abstract: For organizations to be ready and resilient, they need to understand how attempts to improve the organization through training or other tools at one level of organizational structure (i.e., individuals, groups) impact other levels of the organization. An inherent assumption of individual resilience training programs is that improvement in individual resilience skills will result in units that are better equipped to address adversity. Hypothesized effects of improved unit resilience include improvements in organizational mission readiness and enhanced community resilience. Research is presented on understanding the relationships between individual and unit-level resilience via a systematic literature review and a meta-analysis. The research providing mechanistic accounts of relationships between unit resilience and organizational readiness or community resilience as it relates to large organizations like the U.S. Army is not well understood. Measurement constructs, to the extent that they exist, are needed to understand the relationship between unit resilience and both organizational readiness and community resilience.

M4-C.5  4:50 pm  Perspectives on resilience scholarship and research. Palma-Oliveira J*; University of Lisbon

Abstract: Concepts are often prone to ambiguities driven by a metaphorical usage that undermine science endeavors. Resilience, sustainability, risk, and risk communication are prime examples of this, where practitioners within these fields frequently contend with inaccurate or imprecise disciplinary definitions that ultimately lead to logic faults or unclear guidance for customers and stakeholders. To address such concerns, this talk delves into the core meaning behind the disciplinary use of ‘resilience’ to advocate for a more operationalized usage of the term in our daily lexicon. Specifically, this talk will discuss resilience components such as (i) its normatively neutral (rather than inherently positive) framing, (ii) its inherent focus upon systemic and multi-temporal risk events, and the occasionally paradoxical relationship between resilience and sustainability in applied resilience scholarship and research. In this vein, this talk will raise a brief overview of the human – environment interaction in order to highlight the systematic entropic action that can simultaneously generate system resilience in some cases while increase system brittleness to the effects of others.

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