Society For Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2013

Session Schedule & Abstracts


* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.

Common abbreviations

M3-I
Symposium: Risks of Transportation Disruptions and Transporting Dangerous Goods

Room: Latrobe   1:30 PM - 3:00 PM

Chair(s): Cameron MacKenzie   camacken@nps.edu

Sponsored by EISG



M3-I.1  13:30  A case study in estimating mitigated risk for safety regulators: Hazardous materials transportation. Locke MS*; Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration   michael.locke@dot.gov

Abstract: Government oversight of industrial hazards is focused on the prevention and diminution of negative consequences (chiefly harm to humans, as well as environmental and property damage or loss), at times evaluating systemic performance only up to the point of judging whether the total magnitude of said consequences was greater or less than the previous year. In fields such as commercial transportation of dangerous goods, it can be difficult to assess how much of this annual variation would be preventable with further investment versus what is simply attributable to the inherent, residual risk of a multimodal, human-designed and human–run system. Presenting this data relative to trends in economic activity provides more context but is complicated by the often-fragmentary nature of exposure data, with volumes of material shipped being broadly surveyed only once every five years. Altogether, however, this information only gives part of the picture: failures of risk management. The U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, in the continual process of self-assessment, is developing methods for capturing estimates of successfully mitigated risk—that is, the potential consequences averted through purposeful intervention. This initiative intends to explore questions including: How or from when do we determine baseline risk? Can we decompose or partition the effects of government interventions such as regulations, outreach, and enforcement? What is the return on investment of a dollar spent on safety oversight? and How do we avoid double-counting benefits, i.e., saving the same life over again with every new regulation?

M3-I.2  13:50  Alternative Strategies to Positive Train Control (PTC) for Reducing Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk. Liu X, Saat MR*, Barkan CPL; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign   mohdsaat@illinois.edu

Abstract: The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 requires railroads to implement Positive Train Control (PTC) on most lines transporting Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials before 31 December 2015. The motivation for this requirement is the belief that by so doing, the likelihood of accidents in which TIH materials would be released would be reduced. However, the particular types of accidents that PTC can prevent comprise only a small percentage of the total accidents with the potential to result in a TIH release. Association of American Railroads (AAR) estimates that these PTC-preventable accidents (PPA) are less than 4% of total mainline accidents. Meanwhile, implementation of PTC is extremely costly. Cost benefit analysis of the PTC rule by Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) indicates that the railroads will incur approximately $20 in PTC costs for each $1 in PTC safety benefit. Consequently, the industry believes that there are other, more cost-effective means of reducing the risk of TIH accidents. This study identified a set of the most promising potential alternative strategies to PTC, and quantitatively assess their potential to reduce TIH transportation risk.

M3-I.3  14:10  Using PortSec for policy-making and risk-benefit balancing. Orosz M*, Salazar D, chatterjee S, Wei D, Zhao Y; University of Southern California   mdorosz@isi.edu

Abstract: Seaports, airports, and other transportation nodal points face many challenges – including maximizing operational efficiency, minimizing risk from terrorism or other man-made and natural disaster events and minimizing impacts to the environment. Often these challenges are at odds with one another – increasing one often comes at the expense of achieving others. This is particularly true in our Nation’s seaport infrastructures where there is a need to secure the ports but not at the expense of maintaining port operations. The University of Southern California’s National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) is developing PortSec – Port Security Risk Analysis and Resource Allocation System. Under funding from DHS S&T and in collaboration with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (POLA/LB) and the USCG, USC is currently extending a previously developed proof-of-concept PortSec prototype used for tactical security decision-making into a tool that allows decision-makers to examine the trade-offs in implementing security measures to protect the port and support continued movement of shipped goods.

M3-I.4  14:30  Modeling Resilience Stochastic Metrics with Bayesian Kernel Methods: Application to Inland Waterway Networks. Baroud H*, Barker K; University of Oklahoma   hbaroud@ou.edu

Abstract: Critical infrastructure systems such as transportation systems have been vulnerable in the past decade to numerous disruptive events. Analyzing the risk involved with such systems requires accounting for preparedness and response decision making under uncertainty. This paper applies a Bayesian kernel approach to model the resilience of infrastructure systems, an approach aimed at accurately quantifying and estimating the resilience of a transportation system under the uncertainty of disruptive events given data describing the characteristics of the infrastructure system and disruption scenario. The resilience of the overall system relies on the performance of the individual links impacted by the event. Therefore, considering importance measures for individual links helps in identifying the links that most impact the resilience of the entire system, thus providing priorities for preparedness and recovery focus. The “resilience worth” of a link is an index that quantifies how the time to total network service resilience is improved for a certain disruptive event scenario if this link is invulnerable. The model is deployed in an application to an inland waterway transportation network, the Mississippi River Navigation system for which the recovery of disrupted links represented by sections of the river is analyzed by estimating the resilience using the Bayesian kernel model. Note that this type of application suffers from the sparse data due to the scarce occurrence of disruptions. Therefore, we supplement our modeling approach with sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameters of the prior distribution. Such a model introduces a higher level of accuracy to the estimation of the resilience worth of individual links as historical information pertaining to the characteristics of each link helps in shaping the posterior distribution. The model can assist risk managers in enhancing preparedness and recovery activities for different segments of an infrastructure system by analyzing the recovery trajectory from other disrupted segments.



[back to schedule]