Society For Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2013

Session Schedule & Abstracts


* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.

Common abbreviations

M2-H
Bioterrorism Application

Room: Johnson A&B   10:30 AM- 12:00 PM

Chair(s): Henry Willis, Steve Bennett   hwillis@rand.org

Sponsored by SDSG



M2-H.1  10:30  : A second look at bioterrorism scenarios for the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA). Middleton JK*, Stoeckel DM, Nilsen M, Winkel D, Anderson D, Pals T; 1, 2, 3, 4 - BATTELLE, 5, 6, - DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE   middletonj@battelle.org

Abstract: The Department of Homeland Security’s Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) includes a large number of scenarios to provide a comprehensive assessment of risk to the nation. Advancements in technology and emergence or re-emergence of pathogenic organisms require that the scenarios considered within the assessment be revisited on a regular basis. To reduce the burden associated with full implementation into the BTRA and to ensure that including a pathogen, technology, or target into the BTRA is worth the investment, DHS has tested applicability of an analytic approach used in the historic biological research program and has developed a method for assessing the potential consequences of a new scenario as a preliminary assessment. The method minimizes the input data needed for the scenario and simplifies the target considerations to a few specific targets that provide a reasonable assessment of potential consequences. This new methodology will be presented along with an overview of how the method will help to guide inclusion of scenarios within the BTRA.

M2-H.2  10:50  Indicators and warnings for biological events: enhanced biosurveillance through the fusion of pre-hospital data. Bennett SP*, Waters JF, Howard K, Baker H, McGinn TJ, Wong DY; U.S. Department of Homeland Security   steve.bennett@hq.dhs.gov

Abstract: The United States is vulnerable to a range of threats that can impact human, agricultural, or environmental health. Managing risks from covert or naturally-occurring, accidental, or deliberate biological events such as bioterrorism or emerging infectious disease or bioterrorism is difficult to accomplish through activities that attempt to reduce these events’ likelihood of occurrence. Instead, activities that mitigate these risks largely focus on reducing, managing, or limiting the consequences of biological events once they begin to occur. To do this effectively requires the earliest possible warning that an event is occurring, as well as continuing shared situational awareness throughout the event, to enable effective decision making regarding what management actions should be taken. In this presentation, we will describe advances in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) towards integrating and fusing early pre-hospital health data to provide early indicators and warnings. In addition, we will discuss initial concepts for the development of a risk and decision analysis framework to support the use of early warning signals and ongoing event characterization and decision support.

M2-H.3  11:10  Adversarial risk analysis with incomplete information: A level-k approach. Rothschild C, McLay LA*, Guikema SD; University of Wisconsin-Madison   lmclay@wisc.edu

Abstract: This paper proposes, develops, and illustrates the application of level-k game theory to adversarial risk analysis. Level¬-k reasoning, which assumes that players play strategically but have bounded rationality, is useful for operationalizing a Bayesian approach to adversarial risk analysis. It can be applied in a broad class of settings, including settings with asynchronous play and partial but incomplete revelation of early moves. Its computational and elicitation requirements are modest. We illustrate the approach with an application to a simple bioterrorism Defend-Attack model in which the defender’s countermeasures are revealed with a probability less than one to the attacker before he decides on how or whether to attack.



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