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Society For Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2009

Risk Analysis: The Evolution of a Science

Session Schedule & Abstracts

* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.

Common abbreviations

Risk-Informed Decision Framework for Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment and Risk Management Sponsored by DARSG

Room: Baltimore B   1:30-3:00 PM

Chair(s): Igor Linkov

M3-B.1  13:30  Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Analysis at DHS. Klucking S*, Carnell R, McMillan N; US Department of Homeland Security

Abstract: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preventing, protecting from, responding to, and recovering from a wide array of potential threats to the nation. Without question, some of the highest-consequence threats to the nation, should they occur, are the release or detonation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the homeland. As required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 18, DHS performs an integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism risk assessment (ITRA). This risk assessment uses the DHS Quantitative Risk Assessment methodology based on the Probabilistic Risk Assessment framework. First completed in fall 2008, the ITRA is updated biennially. This talk will present the current risk assessment status and methodology. As the science of terrorism risk analysis is fairly new and rapidly advancing, our experience with the evolution of DHS terrorism risk assessments will be highlighted discussed as will the opportunities and challenges for future analyses and assessments of terrorism risk to the homeland.

M3-B.2  13:50  Comparison of the 2008 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment and the Bioterrorism Decision Model. Carnell R*, McMillian N, Klucking S; Battelle Memorial Institute

Abstract: In 2008, the National Research Council of the National Academies released their report entitled Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call For Change. This report outlines a number of criticisms of and recommendations for the 2006 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) and for future DHS risk assessments. One of the recommendations of the NRC panel was to “explore alternative models of terrorists as intelligent adversaries who seek to maximize the achievement of their objectives”. The NRC panel recommended a Bioterrorism Decision Model (BDM) and outlined its implementation. This presentation will describe efforts to implement the BDM using the data and modeling found in the 2008 DHS BTRA. The methodology and data requirements of the BDM will be compared with the 2008 BTRA. Advantages and disadvantages of each approach will be discussed.

M3-B.3  14:10  Subject matter expert elicitation to support the development of Bayesian belief networks for assessing CBRN terrorism risk. McMillan NJ*, Carnell RC, McKinley RM, Weber SA; Battelle

Abstract: The Department of Homeland Security has conducted Biological, Chemical, and Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessments in support of Homeland Security Presidential Directives 10, 22, and 18. These risk assessments use the DHS Quantitative Risk Assessment methodology based on the Probabilistic Risk Assessment framework developed to assess nuclear reactor safety. An integral part of each of these assessments is a quantitative expert elicitation of the U.S. Intelligence Community and other Subject Matter Experts (SME) used to develop the event tree which is represented as a Bayesian belief network (directed acyclic graph). The SMEs are elicited on the proper structure of the belief network, their judgment on the conditional probabilities for each node, and their uncertainty in those judgments. In this presentation, the challenges associated with these elicitations will be discussed. Methods of uncertainty quantification will be examined, including their advantages and disadvantages within the NUREG-1150 process utilized for the DHS Terrorism Risk Assessments. The interplay between experts focused on terrorist intent and technical experts focused on technical capabilities introduces a framing bias into the elicitation process; approaches to minimizing this potential bias as well as the difficulties associated with estimating small probabilities will be discussed. Finally, suggested approaches will be discussed for future improvements including updating elicited information with data.

M3-B.4  14:30  Risk-Informed Decision Framework for Integrated CBRN Risk Assessment and Management. Linkov I*, Tkachuk A, Canis L, Foran C, Benson H, Klucking S, Hawkins N, Bennett S; US Army Engineer Research and Development Center, MIT, Department of Homeland Security

Abstract: Terrorist use of WMD, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRNs), present significant challenges to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The current CBRN countermeasure tool kit consists of a disparate array of sampling, detection, and identification devices whose output DHS decision makers must use in concert with various hazard modeling, simulation and risk assessment programs to estimate the CBRN threats and to make physical protection and operational decisions. This presentation introduces the Risk-informed Decision Framework (RIDF) that integrates results of risk assessment as well as expert judgment using multi-criteria decision analysis and life-cycle assessment tools. The vulnerabilities of potential targets are analyzed in connection with countermeasures aimed at eliminating risks. Integration of the CBRN weapon life cycle (from weapon design and development stage to long-term impact) with assessment of countermeasure provides a flexible and adaptive framework for managing CBRN risks. The general RIDF output is a list of risk-prioritized countermeasures or countermeasure portfolios that facilitates focusing resources on the most important and critical gaps and vulnerabilities to ensure the most cost-effective use of resources against an increasingly complex threat environment.

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