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Society For Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2008

Risk Analysis: the Science and the Art

Session Schedule & Abstracts

* Disclaimer: All presentations represent the views of the authors, and not the organizations that support their research. Please apply the standard disclaimer that any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in abstracts, posters, and presentations at the meeting are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization or agency. Meeting attendees and authors should be aware that this disclaimer is intended to apply to all abstracts contained in this document. Authors who wish to emphasize this disclaimer should do so in their presentation or poster. In an effort to make the abstracts as concise as possible and easy for meeting participants to read, the abstracts have been formatted such that they exclude references to papers, affiliations, and/or funding sources. Authors who wish to provide attendees with this information should do so in their presentation or poster.

Common abbreviations

T4-J CRS Perspectives on Broadening Risk considerations for Infrastructure Design Room: Hancock   4:00-5:30 PM

Chair(s): Brian Meacham

T4-J.1  16:00  General resource allocation for security and protection (GRASP): A framework for public administrators and private managers. Sarkis J*, Azaria C, Ratick S, Meachem B, Thompson G, Goble R; Clark University   jsarkis@clarku.edu Abstract: Organizations select projects to mitigate risk and improve security of entities under their purview. Tools to support this process need to go beyond traditional capital rationing models. These models have limits and rarely incorporate explicit consideration of costs, risks, and benefits beyond traditional tangible valuations. We have found municipalities with mandates to fund programs with limited resources. Thus, municipalities have to determine various characteristics of the programs including vulnerability, risk, impact scope, event uncertainty, locational visibility, and other factors. The priorities, depending on event currency, will change, investment structures will also change. For example, the perceived vulnerabilities and impacts of terrorist events will be of importance after the event occurs, while natural disaster events may garner greater interest by managers if a recent natural event has occurred. Some allocations may simultaneously address many risk situations or events depending on program. These and other characteristics and nuances need to be integrated into management decision models. In this presentation we introduce the ‘Generalized Resource Allocation for Security and Protection Model’. A variety of factors ranging from program characteristics to managerial perceptions of vulnerability (including expansion of the risk and hazard taxonomy for extreme risk and security events) are introduced. The possibilities of synergistic investments, those that may address more than one type of event and integration of typical business priority factors such as cost, quality, flexibility, and speed will be included. The conceptual model will be based on multiattribute utility theory incorporating interdependencies of factors and their dynamic nature. The model integrates tangible, intangible, short-run (operational) and long-run (strategic) dimensions. Extensions to the model such as integration of optimization resource allocation models using goal programming will also be advanced in this presentation.

T4-J.2  16:20  CRS criteria for testing the applicability of adaptive management concepts to emergency planning and response: A study case for fire . Meacham BJ*, Sarkis J, Araiza C; Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Clark University, Claremont Graduate University   bmeacham@wpi.edu Abstract: Concepts of adaptive management have begun to be considered for disaster mitigation and emergency response. A fundamental basis for the view that adaptive management concepts can be effective for disaster mitigation and emergency response is the assertion that one cannot develop disaster mitigation and emergency response plans or policies which can a priori anticipate all possible events, and therefore, the plans and policies should be structured in such as way so as to learn from actual events as they occur, or within a reasonable time after the event, and adapt appropriately. Adaptive approaches make sense for disaster mitigation and emergency response because the situations are complex and adaptive, changing with time, agent, and agent influences, are highly uncertain and challenging to predict (at least for some critical details), and the ultimate effectiveness is driven by actions taken by agents during events. In considering various perspectives on complex adaptive systems and adaptive management, the Center for Risk and Security (CRS) suggest that adaptive management concepts may be well suited to some, but not all, types of disaster mitigation and emergency response planning and implementation, and propose a set of key assumptions, goals and features for use in determining suitability for adaptive approaches. The CRS criteria for testing the applicability of adaptive management or emergency planning and response are presented, along with outcomes of a study case for fire as an extreme event. The study case illustrates that adaptive management concepts can be helpful in identifying better fire regulatory approaches, mitigation design concepts, evacuation strategies and emergency response requirements, including technologies and strategies to increase situational awareness for building occupants and first responders, which will result in more efficient and effective evacuation and emergency response, and decreased life loss, damage and financial impact.

T4-J.3  16:40  Application of set cover location modeling and hazard zone sets to site emergency and backup facilities. Ratick S*, Meacham BJ; Clark University, Worcester Polytechnic Institute   SRatick@clarku.edu Abstract: The use of emergency backup and storage facilities to supplement existing facilities in response to the potential effects of various natural and anthropogenic hazards (e.g. floods, fires, outages, and acts of malice) can be an effective way of reducing vulnerability and enhancing the resilience of existing supply chain and other logistics functions. Although there can be additional costs associated with utilizing emergency backup and storage facilities, they can be a particularly attractive and cost-effective alternative in those cases where long-term disruptions can, or should be, expected. We use set cover location modeling as a decision aid to determine the number of backup facilities to locate under varying cover, anti-cover and complementary anti-cover distances. We then add the flexibility of allowing existing facilities to serve as backup facilities and explore the interrelationships among hazards, vulnerability and location models. To address the issue of vulnerability to different types of hazards in the location models, we define and use the concept of Hazard Zone Set, which is comprised of the potential locations for backup facilities that would be vulnerable to the same hazards (e.g. floods, fires, acts of malice) as the primary facility. The development of the hazard zone sets, and the input data for the location models, are facilitated by the use of Geographical Information Systems. By accounting for the distance between facilities, the potential exposure of facilities to the same geographically-related hazard event, and the costs associated with opening new or utilizing existing facilities, this approach can provide a powerful and flexible tool to assist with back-up and emergency facility location decisions. We demonstrate this through application of the model to emergency facility siting problem in the Northeast United States.

T4-J.4  17:00  Multi-criteria frameworks for considering diverse risks in infrastructure design. Thompson G*; Institute for Resource and Security Studies, and Clark University   gthompson@irss-usa.org Abstract: Major items of infrastructure have lifetimes of decades. The design of new infrastructure must now account for uncertain trends and diverse risks over coming decades. Relevant global issues include: resource constraints (peak oil, etc.); environmental limits (climate change, etc.); geopolitics (competing power centers, roles of multilateral bodies, etc.); natural and industrial hazards (infectious disease, etc.); economic interconnections (propagating financial crises, etc.); weapon developments (nuclear proliferation, etc); and asymmetric conflict (terrorism, etc.) Design concepts for addressing those issues include: sustainability; resilience; flexibility; and precaution. Those broad concepts yield specific design principles such as: diversity; redundancy; independence or loose coupling of system elements; passive safety; fault tolerance; de-materialization; industrial ecology; and renewable supply of energy and materials. Social approaches to design include: environmental and social impact assessment; integrated resource planning; and various modes of stakeholder engagement. Design of a particular item of infrastructure must apply these concepts and approaches in the context of specific constraints and opportunities. The design process operates within a framework of rules, practices, concepts, institutional interests, and expectations. Optimization of design requires the weighing of multiple objectives by a range of stakeholders. These considerations create major new challenges in infrastructure design. The risk-analysis community can contribute by developing multi-criteria frameworks to address diverse risks. This presentation discusses needs and opportunities in developing those frameworks, and potential approaches to that task.

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