![]() |
| HomeAbout SRAMembershipEventsNewsletterJournalOpportunitiesResourcesContact |
| Back to 2007 Meeting Main Page |
M4-H |
| Chair(s): Heather Rosoff |
|
M4-H.1 16:00 Estimating Likelihood of Terrorist Attacks by Modeling Terrorist Objectives and Values. John R*; University of Southern California richardj@usc.edu Abstract: Terrorism risk analysis requires estimation of both the likelihood of attack and the magnitude of the consequences of an attack. Current methods focus on target vulnerability, terrorist capability, and attack consequence. These methods ignore the motivational aspect, a key component to any analysis of terrorism risk. Analogous to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods applied to estimate both natural and technological hazard probabilities, we extend PRA methods to estimate the likelihood of terrorist attack by modeling the desirability or utility of a particular attack alternative. We propose psychological models of terrorist objectives and values that substitute for more traditional physical, chemical, and biological models common in PRA of natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes) and technological hazards (e.g., nuclear power plants). Relative likelihood of terrorist attacks is functionally related to the terrorists' utility of attack. We illustrate methods to construct terrorist value structures, including an objectives hierarchy and a multi-attribute utility model of terrorist values. These value models include terrorist uncertainties about the outcome of the attack, and uncertainties in our knowledge of the terrorist value functions, including parameters representing terrorists' attitude toward risk and trade-offs among conflicting objectives. We suggest practical applications of this methodology for setting counter-terrorism policy, including allocation of funds for counter-terrorism. |
|
M4-H.2 16:20 Matching Radicals: Some Insights into the Ecology of Radicalization from an Agent-based Model. Genkin M, Gutfraind A*; Cornell University ag362@cornell.edu Abstract: We have constructed an agent-based model in order to understand the social environment which causes radicalization. In particular we looked at social venues, which we call "magnets", and modeled how they create new ties between agents. One of the insights from the model is that radicalization - the formation of radical cliques - may occur through different mechanisms depending on the fraction of the population susceptible to radical ideologies. When they are relatively common, radicalization is driven by what we call "radical magnets" - magnets that attract exclusively radicals. Yet, when radicals are rare, radicalization is driven by seemingly "neutral magnets" - like sports activities - that attract radicals and non-radicals alike. By understanding how radical cells form, the model suggests policies that could help disrupt the formation of terrorist cells and thus mitigate terrorism risk. |
|
M4-H.3 16:40 Modeling the Impact of Community Intervention Following a Terrorist Strike. Burns W*; California State University, San Marcos rosoff@usc.edu Abstract: Identifying those factors that contribute to timely and effective community intervention is crucial to our ability to model the consequences of a terrorist strike in an urban area. To examine the impact of such intervention, a system dynamics model was constructed using survey and interview data that examines how a community is likely to respond to a terrorist attack along several dimensions. For different terrorist and accidental scenarios, intensity of investigation, media coverage, public risk perception, diffusion of fear and community intervention were simulated over an entire year. Terrorist attacks generated extensive media coverage, high perceptions of risk and the rapid diffusion of fear. While media coverage began decreasing within a week, fear and especially perception of risk tended to decline slowly for terrorist events. Delays in community intervention contributed to higher and more prolonged levels of fear. Interviews with community leaders and first responders identified factors that may lead to delayed response. These findings should prove useful to those wishing to plan mitigation strategies for different contingencies involving terrorism. |
|
M4-H.4 17:00 What Do We Know About Public Perception of Terrorism Risks? Rosoff H*, John R; University of Southern California rosoff@usc.edu Abstract: The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) confronted the American public with a reality that had previously been of peripheral concern. Since there have been a limited number of terror-related attacks on United States soil, it is relatively unclear how Americans perceive the likelihood and consequences of different attack types. It is also unclear how the American public might react and respond in the event of different attack types. We apply the psychometric model to answer the question of how terrorism risk is related to perceived likelihood and consequence of an attack. Specifically, we asked survey participants to assess the risk of various natural, manmade and terror-related disasters. Each disaster was evaluated based on the risk to themselves and society, probability of disaster occurrence in the next year and the expected number of fatalities from a given event. We further extend the analysis to compare aggregated and individual responses across disaster type and risk attributes. Understanding the terrorist threat is critical to maintaining public moral, sustaining economic activity, and limiting disruption to normal daily routines. Obtaining a deeper understanding of how Americans perceive the terrorist threat will assist the development of policies and procedures for educating and preparing the nation for the impacts of an act of terrorism if it were to occur. |