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W2-A |
| Chair(s): Troy Tucker troy@ramas.com |
| A better understanding of the way in which the human brain processes information relevant to risk might substantially improve the communication of risk to the public. Rapid progress in this direction is being made, in parallel, in three distinct scientific disciplines: Psychometric risk perception research, neuroscience, and the evolutionary social sciences. This session will explore theories of and strategies for risk communication informed by recent research in these disparate fields and summarize the results of the Montauk Risk Communication Symposium held on Long Island, New York. The session focuses on what experimental, survey, and brain imaging research is revealing about how humans process and perceive uncertainty and risks and what the evolutionary history of humans suggests about how we understand and respond to risks. The speakers will provide a synthesis of findings that can inform risk communication research and practice, and conclude the second session (M2-D) with a panel discussion. |
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W2-A.1 1:30 PM Parental mental models of lead paint hazards: Toward improved communications about environmental health risks to children. Bostrom A*, Hoffmann S, Krupnick A, Adamowicz V; Georgia Institute of Technology abostrom@gatech.edu Abstract: Two decades of work in cognitive and decision science have begun to show how people represent knowledge about their decision environment in mental models. Craik described mental models as "small-scale model[s] of external reality" that people invoke and 'run' in their heads to see how to understand and explain the world. These models are associations that exist within long- or short-term memory and strongly influence how information is retained, recalled and used in decision settings. Mental models research, rooted in decision analysis and behavioral decision research, provides a foundation for developing risk communications and facilitating informed decision making. This paper uses preliminary results from the mental models portion of an ongoing study of family decision making about children's environmental health to illustrate how mental models research can be used to inform risk communication development. To assess parental beliefs about exposures, effects, mitigation, children's health and care, as well as how they make decisions about these, we elicited 38 parents' mental models of lead paint hazards (19 home-owning couples, in Atlanta, Georgia, with homes built before 1978 and children under 7 years of age). Most notable among the findings are: that parents are aware of lead paint as an environmental risk, but feel they can control the risk; that many parents are unaware of specific health effects of exposure to lead paint; and that parents appear to place overly high confidence in do-it-yourself tests (which are not recommended by US EPA). Additionally, mothers in this sample are in general more knowledgeable and more concerned about this environmental health risk to children than fathers. Implications for communications are discussed. |
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W2-A.2 1:50 PM Strategies for risk communication: The Montauk guidance. Ferson SD*, Tucker WT; Applied Biomathematics scott@ramas.com Abstract: The Montauk symposium on risk communication focused on what psychometric risk perception research, neuroscience, and the evolutionary social sciences are revealing about how we understand and respond to risks. One result of the symposium is a guidance document for practical risk communication and a research agenda organized around the need to understand the evolved mental calculi humans use to evaluate uncertainty and make decisions in the face of risk. This guidance and agenda are not endorsed or subscribed to by all symposium participants, however, we believe they provide a basis for interdisciplinary collaboration and progress towards a common language and goals. |
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W2-A.3 2:10 PM Why risk communication often fails the benefit-cost test: 'Tis no gift to be simple. Finkel AM*; Princeton University and UMDNJ School of Public Health afinkel@princeton.edu Abstract: Thoughtful observers of the polarizing effects of what often passes for "risk communication" have long decried its patronizing tone and tendency to preach rather than also listen, with limited impact. In addition, risk communication often suffers from the impulse to oversimplify, which may make the message easier to understand but also misleading, irrelevant, or manipulative. A major challenge for integrating the wealth of new findings about the neurochemical and psychosocial bases of risk perception will be to explore how people process information about risks, costs, and choices that is sufficiently nuanced to be a useful guide to decision-making. Some speakers at the Montauk meeting emphasized aspects of risk information that are often lost in the rush to oversimplify, while others discussed possible limitations on our ability to process all the relevant dimensions of risky choice; this presentation will attempt to reconcile these lines of argument. |
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W2-A.4 2:30 PM A tri-reference point model of risk analysis and communication. Wang XT*; University of South Dakota xtwang@usd.edu Abstract: Normative models of risky choice often use an aggregated single number (expected utility) to evaluate choice alternatives at the cost of losing information about the distributions of expected outcomes, which is an essential part of risk communication. Based on converging evidence from behavioral decision making studies, management science, and risk-sensitive foraging theory, we present a Tri-Reference Point model of risk analysis and communication, which takes into consideration minimum requirement (MR), goal (G) and status quo (SQ), with a descending evaluation priority, respectively. We propose that G, SQ and MR demarcate the outcome space into four functional regions (i.e., success, gain, loss, and failure), partition risks according to the payoff distribution of each choice option, and entail values to different parts of an outcome distribution. We examine how people make use of risk distributions (i.e., variations in expected payoffs) to maximize the probability of reaching a goal and to minimize the likelihood of falling below a minimum requirement (MR) in both laboratory experiments and field studies. Implications for the analysis of fanatical risks, inter-temporal choice and emotional reactions to risk will be discussed. |