W9 - Symposium
Evidence Based Decision-Making in Europe and US: Regulatory Impact Analysis Practices and Stakeholder ResponseSapphire 10:30 am-Noon
|
| Chair(s): G. Charnley
|
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is a tool to estimate the positive and negative effects of new regulation. It is an analytic tool of ‘better regulation’. Depending on the institutional focus, RIA can be used to assess economic, social and environmental impacts of regulation or mainly economic ones in terms of costs and benefits. In the US, the economic analysis of costs and benefits by regulatory agencies has been broadly used since 1981. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is used to provide insights into how regulatory analyses could be improved. However, the use of such technique has been strongly criticised (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2003).The use of CBA is annually scrutinised in the reports to the Congress by the Office of Management and Business (OMB). James Solyst (American Chemistry Council) reviews the past three Reports to Congress and addresses the impact of the reports on regulatory agencies and key stakeholders, particularly the regulated community. He examines whether it has been worth the time and resources spent by stakeholders in producing comments and recommendations for the draft versions of the Reports and if the expectations of stakeholders have been realistic.
The European Union (EU) introduced RIA in the year 2002. The use of CBA in The European Commission’s RIAs is an ongoing debate, as social and environmental values play a major role in a vast number of EU regulations. Jacopo Torriti (King\\\\\\\'s Centre for Risk Management) presents a study on 60 preliminary Impact Assessments produced by the European Commission for 2004 proposals. Findings relate to policy alternatives, methodology of consultation and the level of quantification of the RIA reports. Ragnar Löfstedt (King\\\\\\\'s Centre for Risk Management) adds to this analysis by focusing on the trust dimension. As one of the primary reasons for adopting RIAs in the first place was to increase public trust in the European regulatory process, he addresses the question of whether RIAs led to greater and public and stakeholder trust or not.
|
W9.1 The Benefit of Annually Reporting to the US Congress the Costs and Benefits of Regulation. Solyst Jim; American Chemistry Council Jim_Solyst@americanchemistry.com
Abstract: The 2001 Regulatory Right-To-Know Act calls for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to submit “an accounting statement and associated report” including an estimate of the total costs and benefits of Federal rules and paperwork. To the extent feasible, the report should present estimates in the aggregate; by agency and agency program; and by major rule. The report to Congress should also present an analysis of impacts of Federal regulations on State, local, and tribal government, small business, wages and economic growth. Recent OMB reports to Congress have addressed a variety of issues of interest to the risk and analysis community including; approaches to emerging risks, regulations related to Homeland Security, and validation of benefit costs estimates. The Act is a “right-to-know” law, and the purpose of such laws is to provide sufficient transparency which in turn can result in positive modification in behavior. One of the most notable right-to-know provisions is Section 313 of the Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act (SARA) which requires facilities to estimates emissions to the environment.This paper addresses whether the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act has provided sufficient transparency which can lead to beneficial changes, the type of change that has occurred through previous right-to-know laws and programs. The paper reviews the past three Reports to Congress and addresses the impact of the reports on regulatory agencies and key stakeholders, particularly the regulated community. The Reports are issued in draft and stakeholders are encouraged to provide comments and recommendations and to nominate regulations for analysis which then may be addressed in the final report. Thus, stakeholders have the opportunity to invest significant time and resources in providing comments. The paper examines whether it has been worth the time and resources spent by stakeholders, and if the expectations of stakeholders have been realistic.
|
W9.2 The use of RIA in Europe and its role in building public trust.. Löfstedt Ragnar; King's Centre for Risk Mangement, King's College London ragnar.lofstedt@kcl.ac.uk
Abstract: Ever since 2002, (regulatory) impact analysis has been one of the
primary tools of the so-called better regulation agenda in Europe,
calling for an economic analysis for all proposals listed in European Commission Annual Policy Strategy or its Work Programme. Unlike the US based RIAs, the European ones also take into account social and environmental values, and to date more than 100 preliminary (roadmaps) and 49 extended RIAs has been conducted in the EU. These RIAs have been reviewed and evaluated by think tanks (eg European Policy Centre), academics (Exeter, King's College, Manchester) and a wide array of consultants, with mixed results. The aim of this paper is to add to these reviews by focusing on the trust dimension. One of the primary reasons for adopting RIAs in the first place some four years ago was to increase public trust in the European regulatory process. It was envisaged that this would occur as the RIAs would be seen as both transparent (for the first time stakeholders and publics received actual numerical costs and benefits associated with the proposed regulatory measures) as well as rigorous, as it forced civil servants to economically justify their proposed regulations. This paper examines whether these claims are indeed correct. Have RIAs led to greater and public and stakeholder trust or have the use of RIAs actually decreased public and stakeholder trust? The paper addresses this key question, based on an analysis of the European media debate surrounding the use of RIAs and interviews with key stakeholders within and outside the European Commission. This paper has been funded by the GE Foundation.
|
W9.3 An analysis of the European Commission’s Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs): Openness, Transparency and the Level of Quantification. Torriti Jacopo; King's Centre for Risk Management, King's College London jacopo.torriti@kcl.ac.uk
Abstract: A series of research questions arise from the discussion in the European literature on ‘better regulation’ and RIAs (Majone 2004, Radaelli 2003, and Löfstedt 2004). Looking at the European Commission’s RIAs, these questions relate to how policy alternatives are analysed, how transparency is related to consultation and to the extent of quantification of the impacts. Our study consists of an analysis of 60 preliminary Impact Assessments (pre-IAs), recently re-named as ‘roadmaps’, produced by the European Commission (EC) on the 2004 proposals. It examines different pre-IAs with the purpose of gathering both general observations on the content and specific findings on the function of RIAs within the EU regulatory system. To address these questions, we based our analysis on three variables, namely openness, transparency and the level of quantification. The methodology applied to this study differs from previous evaluations of EC’s RIAs (Lee and Kirkpatrick 2004, Vibert 2004, IEEP 2004), as it is designed on content and function tests, according to the analytical framework for evaluating RIAs provided by Harrington and Morgenstern 2004. Cases studies refer to Sustainable Use of Pesticides, DG Environment and Unfair Business-to-consumer Commercial Practices, DG SANCO. The results on policy alternatives of this analysis contrast the assumptions of being ‘open-minded about policy options’ (EC 2003). Transparency is strictly dependent upon factors such as the actors involved, the time and the technique of consultation. The level of quantification in pre-IAs is minimal. Thus, the EC does not quantify impacts of future regulation in the early stage of the proposal. CBA may be carried out for those proposals that need extended IA. However, CBA is not present in the early stages of the decision-making and therefore cannot have a vast influence in the decision-making process. This observation raises questions as to what is the real value of CBA and in the EU decision-making.
|
W9.4 What Role for the Judge in Risk Analysis? Judicial review of science-based decisions within the WTO and the EU legal systems. Alemanno A.; Bocconi University, Milan alberto.alemanno@curia.eu.int
Abstract: This study examines the role played by the courts in reviewing science-based risk regulations by focusing on the WTO and EU legal systems.
As both the WTO and the EC require the presence of scientific justification to determine the legitimacy of national health regulations to avoid disguised forms of protectionism, international adjudicators are increasingly called upon reviewing the scientific soundness of these measures.
But how a judge, by definition a non scientist, may conduct an assessment on whether a measure is scientifically supported?
The answers to this question is relevant to the extent it determines how much regulatory autonomy WTO and EC members enjoy in regulating to protect the health of their people.
Judicial review of science-based risk regulations is further complicated by the recurrent concern according to which an excessive emphasis on scientific justification would not only reduce Members' ability to take into account social and cultural preferences, but it would also curtail their ability to take protective action in situation of scientific uncertainty. In particular, the precautionary principle, by allowing Member States to bypass the scientific justification requirement in the adoption of a risk regulation, raises a new challenge for the judge called to scrutinize a measure inspired by the same principle.
Against this backdrop, this study ventures to suggest some ways of improving the courts’role in reviewing science-based risk regulations.
It argues that to entrust the judge with a meaningful and effective role in assessing the scientific soundness of a national measure requires to make science speak the language of the law, by framing it into a legal scheme capable of effectively being reviewed by an adjudicatory body.
By focusing on the procedural aspects of regulation-making, the judge would look at the way in which a decision has been made rather than analyzing their substantive aspects.
It is suggested that such an approach would promise a less-intrusive review with respect national legislative and social preferences.
|
